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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND CIVIL RIGHTS
OVERVIEW
During the period covered by this survey, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals was presented with a variety of cases in the area of constitutional
law and civil rights. The majority of the cases arose under either section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. There were, however, several significant decisions in the areas of free-
dom of religion, freedom of speech and expression, and the right of the judi-
ciary to review military decisions.
I. SECTION 1983 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871
A. Basis for Liability
Congress, in 42 U.S.C. § 1983,' has provided a remedy for the depriva-
tion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
2
The party seeking relief must "demonstrate that he was deprived of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that any such
deprivation was achieved under color of law.
' '3
1. Due Process and Deprivation of Property
A basic concept of constitutional law is that due process must be af-
forded individuals in actions designed to deprive them of property.4 The
initial inquiry focuses on whether a property interest exists. Once a property
right is established, the scope of the due process protections may be ascer-
tained. Poolaw v. City ofAnadarko5 involved an American Indian who, after
being fired from the city's police force, was not reinstated after the police
review board determined that his termination was improper. Poolaw
claimed that he was subjected to employment discrimination due to his race
in violation of section 19816 and Title VII. 7 Poolaw also asserted a section
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). This section provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress....
2. Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 1980); see also Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
3. Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 1980); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976); Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
4. U.S. CONST. amend V.
5. 660 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1981).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). He alleged certain improper employment practices: "dis-
criminatory job classifications, promotional practices, and rates of pay." 660 F.2d at 461. Poo-
law also asserted that the city's failure to reinstate him after the review board found his
discharge improper to be "racially discriminatory because a Caucasian police officer was rein-
stated under similar circumstances." Id.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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1983 cause of action claiming he was denied equal protection and due pro-
cess of the law through the official conduct of the city.' The district court
dismissed the action for failure to state a claim.
The court of appeals reversed the district court's finding that Poolaw
failed to state a claim under section 1981. The court noted that section 1981
provides a remedy for employment discrimination on the basis of race, 9
whether it is from the public or private sector.10 Finding the existence of a
property right to be "irrelevant to a claim of denial or equal employment
because of race under section 1981," the court held that the allegation of
purposeful employment discrimination on account of the plaintiffs race, was
sufficient to state a claim. 1
Turning to the denial of due process claims,' 2 the court held that state
law must be examined to determine if Poolaw had " 'a legitimate claim of
entitlement to his position,' 13 or a " 'sufficient expectancy of continued em-
ployment to constitute a property interest.' ",14 This holding reversed the
District Court of Oklahoma which relied upon DeBono v. Vizas '5 and Montera
v. Mzias.' 6 In the consolidated cases of DeBono and Montera, the Tenth Cir-
cuit court held that due to the city manager's unfettered discretion regarding
police employment and cause for dismissal, no property interest was cre-
ated.' 7 In contrast, the Poolaw court held that because the Anadarko City
Charter specifically stated that a policeman may not be discharged without
cause, and provided for an independent, objective, and final decision of the
issue through administrative and judicial procedures, Poolaw did have a suf-
ficient interest in continued employment to require due process. 18
In Atencio v. Board of Education, 19 rather than examine the nature of a
property right, the court focused on the issue of the scope of due process
protections. Atencio was dismissed from his position as superintendent of
the school district by the Board of Education. The Board failed to follow the
prescribed conference procedures that were to precede termination. Regula-
8. 660 F.2d at 461.
9. Id. (citing Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975)).
10. 660 F.2d at 462.
11. Id.
12. In addressing the plaintiff's claims that the defendants deprived him of equal protec-
tion, the court held that: "[Tihe constitutional right to equal protection with regard to public
employment does not depend on the existence of a property interest in that employment." Id
The court found the same allegations that supported the plaintiff's claims under § 1981 were
sufficient to state an equal protection claim under § 1983. Id.
13. 660 F.2d at 463 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
14. 660 F.2d at 463 (quoting Hall v. O'Keefe, 617 P.2d 196, 200 (Okla. 1980)).
15. No. 77-1299 (10th Cir. Dec. 18, 1978).
16. No. 77-1300 (10th Cir. Dec. 18, 1978).
17. 660 F.2d at 463. In these cases the court applied a Colorado statute (COLO. REV.
STAT. § 31-4-213(2) (1973)) which creates a protected property interest in certain city jobs.
18. Because the question of the existence of a property interest in Poolaw is a question of
state law, the court determined the Oklahoma Supreme Court, if it were to decide the issue,
would find such an interest did exist in the case. 660 F.2d at 464. The court based its determi-
nation upon the holding of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Hall v. O'Keefe, 617 P.2d 196
(Okla. 1980). "[Tlhe terms of employment established by an employee... may create a suffi-
cient expectancy of continued employment to constitute a property interest which must be af-
forded constitutionally guaranteed due process." Id. at 200.
19. 658 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1981).
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tions provide that prior to notification of discharge for unsatisfactory work
performance, each employee is entitled to two or more conferences with
school personnel. 20 This requirement, Atencio argued, created a property
interest protected by the federal Constitution.
2 1
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a jury verdict for
Atencio, and dismissed the case for failure to establish the federal claim. In
addressing the necessity of following the procedures set forth in the regula-
tions, the court adopted the rationale of the Sixth Circuit: "[A] breach of
state procedural requirements is not, in and of itself, a violation of the Due
Process Clause."' 22 Noting that an " 'action under the civil rights statutes is
not a plenary review of a challenged state administrative procedure,' ",23 the
court found the proper avenue for review was that provided by New Mexico
law. 2 4 A federal constitutional violation would exist if Atencio was "denied
a fair forum for protecting his state rights."'2 5 The court of appeals, however,
found the procedure to be sufficient under the due process clause.
26
In Phelps v. Kansas Supreme Court, 27 the court examined what process is
due in a disciplinary action against an attorney. The Kansas Supreme
Court had upheld a Review Panel's finding of four violations of Kansas dis-
ciplinary standards by Phelps. In addition, the court found a fifth violation
that was not specified in the complaint. 28 In light of both the evidence
before it and Phelp's prior disciplinary history, he was disbarred. Phelps
filed a section 1983 suit in federal district court alleging a denial of due pro-
cess. Phelps claimed the addition of a violation, of which he had no notice
or opportunity to defend, constituted a deprivation of property without due
process of law. The district court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss.
2 9
The Tenth Circuit court held that due process was not violated. 30 The
fact that the Kansas Supreme Court found one statutory and three ethical
20. Id at 777.
21. Id
22. Id. at 779. In Bates v. Sponberg, 547 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1976), the court held:
It is not every disregard of its regulations by a public agency that gives rise to a
cause of action for violation of constitutional rights. Rather, it is only when the
agency's disregard of its rules results in a procedure which in itself impinges upon due
process rights that a federal court should intervene in the decisional processes of state
institutions.
Id at 329-30.
23. 658 F.2d at 779 (quoting Whitsel v. Southeast Local School Dist., 484 F.2d 1222, 1227
(6th Cir. 1973)).
24. 658 F.2d at 779.
25. Id at 780.
26. Id (citing Harrah Independent School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 197-98 (1979);
Prebble v. Broderick, 535 F.2d 605, 617 (10th Cir. 1976)).
27. 662 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 198 1),cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2009 (1982).
28. 662 F.2d at 650. The Review Board's findings were: I) dishonest conduct in violation
of DR 1-102(A)(4); 2) conduct prejudicial to the administration ofjustice in violation of DR I-
102(A)(5); 3) false statements in violation of DR 7-102(A)(5); and 4) signing a pleading in bad
faith in violation of a Kansas statute. The fifth violation, found by the supreme court, was a
violation of DR 7.102(A)(1) (prohibition against action which serves to harass or maliciously
injure another). Id
29. Id
30. Id at 652.
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violations arising out of the same incident, any one sufficient to sustain the
disbarment decision, enabled the Tenth Circuit to find no due process viola-
tions.3 ' As additional support for this holding, the court noted that "[tihe
evidence supporting the additional violation was the same as that supporting
the other ethical violations."' 32 The court likened this case to a criminal case
with multiple charges and the imposition of a general sentence. "[The] sen-
tence may be upheld if conviction on any one of the counts is
supportable."
33
In his dissent, Judge McKay objected to the majority's assumption that
the Kansas Supreme Court would have disbarred Phelps regardless of the
additional violations found. He argued that this assumption allowed the
majority to distinguish improperly the United States Supreme Court case of
In Re Rufalo.34 In Ruffalo the Court held that the "absence of fair notice as
to the reach of the grievance procedure and the precise nature of the charges
deprived [the attorney] of procedural due process."' 35 Judge McKay viewed
the majority's distinction that Ruffalo "involved two distinct incidents, only
one of which was charged," whereas Phelps involved "several charges grow-
ing out of the same incident, '36 as a distinction without a difference in a due
process analysis.
3 7
Rodziewicz v. Widener38 involved a prisoner's claim that his watch was
broken by the jail authorities while he was in custody. When the authorities
denied breaking the watch and refused to reimburse him, he sued for forty-
five dollars, alleging deprivation of property without due process. 39 In its
decision, the Tenth Circuit relied upon the recent Supreme Court case, Par-
rafl v. Taylor.4° Under Parrall if the deprivation was unintentional or did not
occur as a result of established state procedures, and the state provided a
remedy that met the requirements of due process, no claim was stated under
section 1983.4 1 The Tenth Circuit found both prongs of the test were met
and dismissed the constitutional claim.
42
2. First Amendment
In Owens v. Rush ,'43 the plaintiff appealed from a dismissal of a claim
that the defendants fired him from his position as under-sheriff in retaliation
for helping his wife file a Title VII discrimination action against the sheriff's
31. Id
32. Id
33. Id (citing Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 115 (1959)).
34. 390 U.S. 544, modied, 392 U.S. 919 (1968).
35. 390 U.S. at 552.
36. 662 F.2d at 652 (McKay J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 653.
38. No. 81-2290 (10th Cir. Feb. 11, 1982).
39. Id slip op. at 2.
40. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
41. Id at 543. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106(1)(b) (1973) exempts from sovereign immu-
nity the prosecution of tortious claims arising from the operation of a penitentiary such as
Rodziewicz' claim.
42. No. 81-2290, slip op. at 3.
43. 654 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 60:2
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department. 4 4 Both Owens and his wife held positions in the sheriff's de-
partment. Anne Owens began legal proceedings against the Board of
County Commissioners for unlawful discrimination in the form of disparate
pay scales. Prior to her filing the lawsuit in federal court alleging violations
of numerous constitutional and statutory rights, Owens and his wife received
termination notices.
45
Owens claimed that the defendants' action violated his first amendment
right to free speech and association and interfered with a protected property
interest, his public employment.46 After determining that Owens did not
have a vested interest or property right in his position, the district court,
following the reasoning of Abeyta v. Town of Taos, dismissed the case.47 In
Abeyta, the Tenth Circuit held that former municipal employees had no pro-
tected property interest in their position unless circumstances indicated a
continued right to employment; absent a property interest in their employ-
ment due process was not required prior to termination. 48
In its decision in Owens, the Tenth Circuit noted the difference between
a procedural due process claim and a first amendment claim. While proce-
dural due process requires a property interest to trigger constitutional pro-
tections, a free speech claim under the first amendment does not.49 "The
First Amendment clearly affords protection against action penalizing or in-
hibiting the exercise of such constitutional rights, even absent a contractual
or tenure right to continued employment. '50 The Abeyta holding was inap-
plicable to the facts due to its reliance on the lack of a protected property or
liberty interest to sustain aprocedural due process claim. 5' Because " 'assist-
ing' litigation vindicating civil rights; attending meetings on necessary legal
steps; and associating for the purpose of assisting persons seeking legal re-
dress [are] 'modes of expression and association protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.. ,' "52 the appellate court reversed the district
court's dismissal of Owen's first amendment claim.
The court of appeals discussed the first amendment and its relation to
public employment more thoroughly in Chdlders v. Independent School Distrlct
No. /.53 Childers was a tenured teacher who claimed that he was involunta-
rily reassigned by the Board of Education in retaliation for exercising his
constitutional right to support a board candidate and to organize a teachers'
union. In his claim under section 1983, he argued that the reassignment
denied him a property interest without according him any due process pro-
44. Id. at 1372.
45. Id at 1373.
46. Id at 1377-78.
47. 499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974).
48. Id Se. also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972).
49. 654 F.2d at 1379 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972)).
50. 654 F.2d at 1379.
51. Id
52. Id (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 420-21, 428-29 (1962)). See also In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1977); Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
53. 676 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir. 1982).
1983]
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tections. He also alleged impermissible infringement of his first amendment
rights.
5 4
In disposing of the due process claim, the Tenth Circuit court recog-
nized that while a tenured teacher has "a property right in continued em-
ployment [under Oklahoma law] he does not have a property interest in any
particular position."'55 By separating the right to continued employment
from the right to retain the same position, the court in Childers found that,
under Oklahoma law, a tenured teacher can be demoted with a consequent
reduction in salary without activating constitutional due process considera-
tions.56 Thus, the district court's dismissal was proper.
Turning to Childer's first amendment claim, the court recognized the
necessity of balancing the competing interests involved. While "[plublic em-
ployment may not be conditioned upon relinquishment of the right to en-
gage in activities protected by the First Amendment," 5 7 the state's interests
in regulating the speech of its employees differs significantly from its interests
in the regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.58 Quoting the
Supreme Court's test in Pickerng v. Board of Education59 and its own decision
in Key v. Rutherford,6° the court balanced the employee's private interest in
"commenting upon matters of public concern" with the interest of the em-
ployer, the state, "in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per-
forms through its employees."'6 1  If the employer can show that an
unrestricted exercise of first amendment rights will cause a significant dis-
ruption, the employee's rights will be limited to accommodate the state's
interest. Nevertheless, if the employee's activities are protected under Picker-
ing and Key, he must prove that his activities motivated the employer to
alter his employment status. The burden is placed on the employer to show
that he would have made the same decision in the absence of the protected
activity.62 The fact that Childer's employment was not terminated did not
foreclose his section 1983 claim. "Retaliation that takes the form of altered
employment conditions instead of termination may nonetheless be an uncon-
stitutional infringement of a protected activity."'63 In light of this holding,
the court reversed the district court's dismissal of this claim.
A first amendment analysis was also applied in the context of refusal to
renew athletic scholarships at a public university. Marcum v. Dah/64 involved
a suit by several members of the women's basketball team at the University
of Oklahoma who alleged that they were deprived of their scholarships as a
result of their exercise of their first amendment right of free speech. They
54. Id at 1340-41.




59. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
60. 645 F.2d 880, 884 (10th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of this case, see Constitutional Law
and Civil Rights, Eighth Annual Tenth Circuit Survq, 59 DEN. L.J. 239, 243 (1982).
61. 676 F.2d at 1341.
62. Id.
63. Id at 1342.
64. 658 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 60:2
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also alleged a deprivation of property rights without due process.65 During
the 1977-78 season, the plaintiffs told the athletic director they were opposed
to the continued employment of their coach. After the season had ended,
they voiced the same objection to the press, stating they would not play if the
coach was retained. Subsequently, their scholarships were not renewed. 66
The district court judge granted the defendant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and dismissed the action.
6 7
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court's finding that the wo-
men's comments to the press were "not of general public concern" and as
such, did not warrant constitutional protection. 68 The comments to the ath-
letic director were not protected speech because they were "statements at the
school on the internal affairs of the school system [and] do not invoke First
Amendment protection."' 69 Thus, the plaintiffs' first amendment rights were
not violated.
The plaintiffs also contended that the refusal to renew their scholarships
deprived them of a property right without due process. The plaintiffs were
notified twice of the decision not to renew the scholarships and were given a
right to a hearing before the effective date of the scholarships. After the
second notification, the plaintiffs requested a hearing, but subsequently
withdrew the request. A hearing was held, however, with notification to the
plaintiffs' counsel, but no appearance was made. 70 In response to plaintiffs'
argument that a hearing was required before the decision not to renew was
made, the court quoted Fuentes v. Shevtn: 71 " '[I]f the right to notice and
hearing is to serve its full purpose, then it is clear that it must be granted at a
time when the deprivation can still be prevented.' "72 Due to the fact that
the hearing was "in ample time" prior to the effective date of the scholar-
ships, the court found no denial of due process and upheld the dismissal of
this claim. 73 To have held otherwise would have enabled an employee to
make any unprotected in-house statement and then protect himself by going
public in the press or other media.
3. Privacy Interests-Family
The Supreme Court has recognized that the relationship between a par-
65. Id at 733.
66. Id
67. Id
68. Id at 734.
69. Id The Tenth Circuit court, in dicta, apparently analogized a student on an athletic
scholarship at a public university to a public employee.
The exercise of a constitutionally protected right by a public employee does not serve
as a curative for all prior misconduct during the course of employment. A public
employee cannot expunge all prior transgressions from his employment record by
merely exercising a constitutional right. A discharge for exercise of first amendment
rights is impermissible. . . . The exercise of a first amendment right, however, does
not insulate a public employee from being discharged for occurrences prior to the
exercise of the right. (citations omitted).
Id
70. Id at 735.
71. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
72. 658 F.2d at 735 (quoting Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81).
73. 658 F.2d at 735.
19831
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ent and child is constitutionally protected and that interference with that
relationship may give rise to a section 1983 action.7 4 While recognizing this
protection, Wise v. Bravo 75 demonstrates that not all interferences with these
rights rise to a constitutional level.
Wise involved an attempt by several police officers, including Bravo, to
enter Wise's home to retrieve his daughter and return her to her mother.
Wise's daughter was visiting him with the mother's permission. The mother,
however, had changed her mind and wanted the child back sooner than they
had originally agreed. Wise initially refused Officer Bravo entry to his
home, but then allowed him to enter when another officer indicated they
were there in their official capacity.76 Wise sued under section 1983 for in-
terference with his visitation rights, for an assault, and trespass. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the assault
and trespass claims, and dismissed the other claims.
77
In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit court reviewed several United States
Supreme Court decisions that recognized the existence of a fundamental in-
terest in personal rights. 78 The court, however, found "no substantive fed-
eral constitutional, statutory or common law governing family relationships,
including matters of custody and visitation rights between parents and chil-
dren." 79 This area was found to be uniquely within the state's power, sub-
ject to review under the fourteenth amendment.81° Colorado law provided
the plaintiff with several remedies."'
In upholding the trial court's dismissal of the claim for interference with
his visitation rights, the court held that although the officers' actions may
have constituted tortious interference with Wise's rights, the interference did
not rise to a constitutional level. Similarly, the court viewed the allegations
of assault and battery as a type of tort not actionable under section 1983
74. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1977) (right of unwed father to intervene in the
adoption proceedings of his child if he has sought custody of or shouldered significant responsi-
bility for the child); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (right of an expec-
tant mother to continue to teach as long as she is able); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
(right of an unwed father to a hearing on his fitness before his children are removed from his
custody after death of the mother); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (divorced father
to be given notice of any adoption proceeding regarding his children to enable him to contest
the adoption); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate is a basic right).
75. 666 F.2d 1328 (10th Cir. 1981).
76. Id at 1330.
77. Id at 1330-31.
78. Id at 1331. The court cited: Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 645 (1972); Arm-
strong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
79. 666 F.2d at 1332.
80. Id. The court noted that "§ 1983 should not be viewed as a vehicle to resolve a dispute
involving visitation rights-privileges. That is a subject uniquely reserved to the state court sys-
tem. Any claim for relief that Wise may have exists under Colorado law and in the Colorado
state system." Id at 1333.
81. The court cited the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 14-10-
129 (1973) (provides visitation rights to the noncustodial parent); id. § 14-10-121 (enforcement




unless the Aggrieved individual's deprivation rises to a constitutional level.
This occurs only when the actions cause severe injuries or are "grossly dispro-
portionate to the need for action under the circumstances and [are] inspired
by malice. . . amounting to an abuse of official power that shocks the con-
science . *..."82 When the interference rises to this level, a claim under sec-
tion 1983 is made. Finding that Wise failed to allege conduct that met this
criteria, the court upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment.
33
4. Statutory Rights
Phsht'n v. Regents of Un'vers'y of Colorado,8 4 was a suit under section 1983,
by a doctor with multiple sclerosis, alleging that the University had discrimi-
nated against him in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (Act).8 5 Pushkin alleged that the medical school had denied him ad-
mission to the psychiatric residency program solely due to his handicap. The
University appealed the trial court's ruling, that Pushkin was "an otherwise
qualified handicapped individual who had been excluded from a program
receiving federal funds solely by reason of his handicap," and was entitled to
admission to the program.8 6 The Regents' appeal was based primarily on
their contentions that section 504 does not provide for a private right of
action.8 7 Whether a private right of action exists under section 504 is critical
because without it Pushkin would have had no standing to bring the action
under section 1983.
Section 504 is silent as to whether a private right of action exists.88 In
holding that a private right of action does exist, the Tenth Circuit court
noted that the Supreme Court had suggested that such a right exists8 9 and
that "[e]very court of appeals and district court .. .which considered [the]
question [have] held that a private right of action exists under the statute."
°
The Tenth Circuit court also examined the legislative history, finding that it
expressly "permit[ted] a judicial remedy through a private action."9' Addi-
tionally, the Cort v. Ash9 2 test for determining the existence of an implied
82. Id. at 1333.
83. Id
84. 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The statute reads in part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined by
section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
86. 658 F.2d at 1376. See Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 504 F. Supp. 1292, 1299
(D. Colo.) ajfd, 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
87. The other grounds for appeal were that Pushkin failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies and that the trial court's decision was erroneous. 658 F.2d at 1376.
88. Id at 1376-80.
89. Campbell v. Kruse, 434 U.S. 808 (1977).
90. 658 F.2d at 1377 (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit, in Coleman v. Darden, 595
F.2d 533 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979) recognized that a private right of action
may be available under § 504.
91. 658 F.2d at 1379. Se SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, REHABILITA-
TION ACT AMENDS. OF 1974, S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40, repn'ntedin 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6390-91.
92. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The test uses four inquiries:
19831
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private right of action was met. 93
Finally, the court adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Cannon
v. University of Chicago,94 which held that because Title IX of the Civil Rights
Act was patterned after Title VI of the same Act, the implied private right of
action for discrimination in Title VI should be read into Title IX. 95 By
analogy, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that because section 504 of the Rehabil-
itation Act was also patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, the
implied private right of action should extend to section 504.96
Turning to the defendants' contention of failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies, the court held that all of the administrative remedies available
under the act need not be exhausted prior to bringing the suit. 97 The court's
rationale was that a party should not have to pursue a remedy irrelevant to
his particular needs. The Act provides for the possible termination of federal
funding for any organization in violation of the Act. If Dr. Pushkin were to
pursue and succeed with this course of action, it would not remedy the dis-
crimination. On the contrary, it would severely damage, if not destroy, the
program into which he was attempting to obtain admission.9
The final, and perhaps most significant question resolved by the court,
concerned the proper standard of review to be applied under the Rehabilita-
tion Act. The court rejected the University's contention that because no
suspect class, fundamental right, or irrebuttable presumption was involved,
the rational basis test should be applied. 99 Rather, the court interpreted the
statute as providing its own criteria for evaluating claims. The individual
must prove that he is otherwise qualified for the position sought and that he
was rejected solely on the basis of his handicap. 100 Pushkin met his burden of
proof, and the district court's order of injunction was affirmed. 10 1
B. Procedural Problems Under Section 1983
1. Statute of Limitations
Congress did not provide for a statute of limitations for suits brought
under section 1983. Therefore, the federal courts will generally apply the
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was en-
acted"-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second,
is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a
remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the
states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on
federal law? (citations omitted).
Id at 78.
93. 658 F.2d at 1378.
94. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
95. Id at 709.
96. 658 F.2d at 1379-80.
97. Id at 1382.
98. Id at 1381-82.
99. Id. at 1383. This test would have allowed the University to discriminate if it could
articulate a rational basis behind its actions.
100. Id. at 1385.
101. Id at 1387-91.
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state statute of limitations applicable to the most analogous state action.' 0 2
However, in Childers v. Independent School Distrct No. 1, 103 the court of appeals
followed the Supreme Court's holding in Occidental Life Insurance Co. v.
EEOC 104 Occidental requires courts to look beyond the superficial require-
ments of the state statute to the underlying policies and compare them with
the policies of section 1983.105 The court drew a distinction between a state
right and a constitutional right, and stated that a statute of limitations
should be selected that is "sufficiently generous in the time periods to pre-
serve the remedial spirit of federal civil rights actions."' 10 6 An action seeking
to vindicate a federally created right should not be governed by the "proce-
dural hoops" required for state tort cases.
10 7
2. Standing to Sue Under Section 1983
Dohaish o. Tooley 108 illustrates the distinction between the concepts of
cause of action and standing. In Dohaish, the plaintiff not only failed to
present a cause of action, but could not establish standing to maintain an
action. The case involved the death of Saud Dohaish, a Saudi Arabian stu-
dent who died as a result of a bar fight.' 0 9 Eddie Santistevan was arrested
and charged with first degree murder. Shortly after the preliminary hearing,
a prosecutor from the Denver District Attorney's office successfully moved to
dismiss the charges. Subsequently, Abdullah Dohaish, the decedant's father,
filed a section 1983 suit in federal district court, alleging that the district
attorney's refusal to prosecute stemmed from prejudice and violated the
fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act. The district court dis-
missed the action for lack of standing.1 10
The Tenth Circuit evaluated the strengths of Dohaish's section 1983
action on two grounds: standing and the legal sufficiency of the action.llI
The court found standing to be absent; a -section 1983 action is a personal
suit, maintainable only by the individual who suffered the violation of his
civil rights. The court also noted that the citizenry has no recognized right
to bring a lawsuit based upon the nonprosecution of another.i 12 The inabil-
102. Spiegel v. School District No. 1, Laramie County, 600 F.2d 264, 265 (10th Cir. 1979).
103. 676 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir. 1982). This case is also discussed supra text accompanying
notes 51-63.
104. 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).
105. 676 F.2d at 1342-43.
State legislatures do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in
mind, and it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state law
will not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies .... State
limitations periods will not be borrowed if their application would be inconsistent with
the underlying policies of the federal statute.
Id at 1342 (quoting Occidental, 432 U.S. at 367)).
106. 676 F.2d at 1343 (quoting Shouse v. Pierce County, 559 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.
1977)).
107. 676 F.2d at 1343 (quoting Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1162
(9th Cir. 1976) (en banc)).
108. 670 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 60 (1982).
109. 670 F.2d at 935-36.
110. Id at 936.
111. Id
112. Id at 937 (citing Linda S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)).
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ity of the father to prove that his civil rights were violated, barred him from
pursuing the action. 1 3 Additionally, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity
from suit regarding the discretionary decisions inherent in their jobs.
Dohaish had other remedies. He could file an action requesting the state
court to require good cause for dismissing the charge,' 14 and he could file a
wrongful death charge against Santistevan." 5
C. Prisoner Rights
In Daniels v. Gilbreath 116 the court set out the requisite test to be applied
when a prisoner asserts a section 1983 action based upon cruel and unusual
punishment under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Jesse Daniels
died in the Oklahoma Eastern State Hospital, where he was sent from the
McCurtain County Jail for psychiatric evaluation concerning his compe-
tence to stand trial.'' 7 While Daniels was in jail he received no medical
attention." 8 Jesse's father, Hervie Daniels, received permission to take him
from the jail to the hospital where he was to be evaluated. The father spoke
with the treating physician concerning Daniel's prior medical history. He
attempted to tell the treating physician about his son's allergy to certain
medicines, but failed to communicate this information.11 9 When Jesse's be-
havior at the hospital became such that medication was required, he was
given a sedative and died shortly thereafter. The cause of death was never
established. 120
In reversing a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the court of appeals held
that the actions of the sheriff and his department were too indirect to have
been considered a proximate cause of death. "[T]here were intervening acts
subsequent to the time [Daniels] left the jail which rendered their actions
legally remote causes--causes which do not qualify as proximate causes.'
1 2 1
Their actions were removed both temporally and spacially from the activi-
ties associated with Daniels' death. Additionally, he would have been trans-
ferred to the hospital regardless of whether he was given his medication at
the jail. The court also noted that the subsequent events were
unforeseeable. '
22
Regarding Dr. Garcia, the treating physician, the court relied on Estelle
v. Gamble,' 2 3 in holding that an act of medical malpractice does not necessar-
ily rise to the level of constitutional violation. The court indicated that the
plaintiff may assert a claim for medical malpractice in state court. 12 4 Only a
113. 670 F.2d at 937.
114. Id. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-5-204 (1973).
115. 670 F.2d at 938. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-202 (1973).
116. 668 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1982).
117. He was arrested for the robbery and assault of an elderly woman. d. at 478.
118. Id at 478-79.
119. Daniels asserted that the physician "walked away" from him, however, this was never
established. Id at 479, 488.
120. Id at 479.
121. Id at 479-80.
122. Id. at 480.
123. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
124. 668 F.2d at 482.
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deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment barred by the eighth amendment.1 25 The court
held the evidence failed to show that the defendant, Dr. Garcia, "by his
conduct or failure to act, created a condition which was the substantial cause
of death," or that his conduct was done deliberately.1
26
D. Remedies Under Section 1983
The Tenth Circuit, in Garrick v. City and County of Denver,12 7 addressed
several issues concerning punitive damages in a section 1983 suit. Garrick
sought actual and punitive damages for alleged violations of his constitu-
tional rights by Jones, a Denver police officer. Jones shot Garrick several
times during a scuffle following a traffic stop. The jury awarded Garrick
$20,500 in actual damages and $70,000 in punitive damages.' 28
On appeal, it was argued that the exemplary damage award was exces-
sive and that the jury misconceived the purpose of punitive damages. Find-
ing defendants' assertion that the punitive damage award was reviewable
only under Colorado standards meritless, the court held damages under fed-
eral civil rights statutes are to be governed by federal standards.' 29 This
view is harmonious with decisions of the First and Fifth Circuits. 130 "Puni-
tive damages may be awarded under section 1983 even where they would
not normally be recoverable under local law in the state where the violation
occurred."' 13 1 The court upheld the $70,000 verdict, finding that the award
was not so excessive or inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience. 132
While punitive damages are generally assessable in section 1983 actions,
the Tenth Circuit in Ray v. City of Edmond,' 33 narrowed the scope of their
applicability. Ray filed a section 1983 action against the City of Edmond,
Oklahoma, and four of its police officers, charging violations of his civil
rights during his arrest and detention. After the remittitur, the plaintiff re-
ceived one dollar nominal damages for each of the five defendants and a
total of $125,350 in punitive damages, as well as attorneys' fees. The court
reversed the punitive damage award against the city.' 34 Relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts Inc. ,'35 the appel-
125. Id at 481 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05).
126. 668 F.2d at 488. The court emphasized the difference between the proof required in a
§ 1983 action and a case alleging negligence. The 1983 action must prove that there was a
willful failure to give medical attention where it was necessary. "In some circumstances a reck-
less quality attending the conduct would suffice." Id
127. 652 F.2d 969 (10th Cir. 1981).
128. Id at 970.
129. Id at 971 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396
U.S. 229 (1969); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035
(1980)).
130. See McCulloch v. Glasgow, 620 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1980); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d
799 (lst Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
131. 652 F.2d at 971.
132. Id at 972.
133. 662 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
134. Id. at 680.
135. 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (neither historical nor policy considerations support the exposure
of municipalities to punitive damage liability for bad faith actions of employees).
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late court held that a municipality is immune from punitive damages in
section 1983 actions.'
36
II. CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII
The Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with employment discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act)' 3 7 were almost equally
divided between racial discrimination cases and sex discrimination cases.
The scope of the protection afforded by the Act was examined as well as
procedural issues.
A. Standards for a Atna Facie Case
The Tenth Circuit refined its interpretation of the criteria set out by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,138 for establishing a
prima facie case of prohibited discrimination or disparate treatment. Under
McDonnell the plaintiff must show: 1) he or she belonged to a class protected
by Title VII; 2) he or she applied for a job or promotion and was qualified
for the position; 3) he or she was rejected for the job or from promotion
despite being qualified; and 4) after the rejection, the position remained va-
cant, while the employer continued to seek applications from individuals
with the plaintiffs qualifications. 139 The Court, in establishing this stan-
dard, noted, they "are not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing
factual situations." '1
4
In Mortensen v. Callaway, 14' the plaintiff, a civilian chemist employed by
the Army, alleged that she was passed over for a promotion because she was
a woman, and that after her complaint, she suffered retaliatory harassment.
In affirming the trial court's finding for the Army, the court held that while
the plaintiff had established a prima facie case, the Army had established
valid reasons for her rejection.'
42
The court of appeals, following McDonnell,143 limited to three the ele-
ments required for a prima facie case based on the particular facts. Her
showing that the position was filled by another, as well as her proof that she
belonged to a protected class under Title VII, applied for a promotion for
which she was qualified, and was rejected, were sufficient to establish a
prima facie case.'4 The trial court erred in requiring her to show also that
the position had remained open.
145
The court, however, failed to provide any criteria for determining in
136. 662 F.2d at 680. The court noted the effect of its decision in Ray was to "overrule any
suggestions to the contrary in our earlier opinions." Id See, e.g., Simineo v. School Dist. No. 1,
594 F.2d 1353 (10th Cir. 1979).
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-lb (1976).
138. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
139. Id at 802.
140. Id n.13.
141. 672 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1982).
142. Id at 823-24.
143. See text accompanying note 139-40.




future cases when a showing that the position was filled by another would be
sufficient, instead of proving that the position remained open and further
applications were sought. A close reading of the authority relied upon by
the court 146 indicates that the relevance of the criteria is determined by look-
ing to the purpose behind Title VII. Individuals should be allowed to bring
suits under Title VII when they "demonstrate that the alleged discrimina-
tion did not result from a lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy
in the job sought."' 14 7 Flexibility of the criteria for establishing a prima facie
case is necessary to meet the broad remedial purposes of Title VII.' 48 Thus,
proof that the position was filled by a member of the class from which it is
likely that the employer would draw if the employer were discriminating
would tend to serve the same purpose as a showing that the position re-
mained open after the plaintiff's rejection.
149
B. Scope of the Act's Protection
While Title VII provides protection from employment discrimination to
a broad class of individuals, it does not extend to all employees. Title VII
contains an exception for members of the "personal staff' of elected offi-
cials. 150 The applicability of this exception was examined in Owens v.
Rush. 15 1 Owens had been appointed to the position of undersheriff by the
sheriff after the election. Later Owens was fired for aiding his wife in her
effort to file a Title VII action of her own. 152 If Owens' job did not fall
within the exception, his actions on behalf of his wife were protected by Title
VII. 153 The dispute, therefore, focused upon the scope of the "personal
staff" exception.
The Owens court first established the broad parameters of the exception:
"Congress intended for the personal staff exception to apply to only those
individuals who are in highly intimate and sensitive positions of responsibil-
146. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977); Aikens v.
United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 514, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
147. Aikens v. United States Postal Serv., 642 F.2d 514, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1980),cert. denied, 453
U.S. 912 (1981).
148. 672 F.2d at 823.
149. After the establishment of a prima facie case, if the defendant meets his burden of
going forward by showing that his actions were proper, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
show that the defendant's reasons were pretextual. See id.; Montgomery v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
Inc., 671 F.2d 412, 413 (10th Cir. 1982). See also Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981).
150. "[T]he term 'employee' shall not include ... any person chosen by [an elected official]
to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate
adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e() (1976).
151. 654 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981). This case is also discussed supra text accompanying
notes 43-52.
152. 654 F.2d at 1373.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976) provides, in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.
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ity on the staff of the elected official."' 154 The court found that the statute
should be narrowly construed so as not to defeat this intent. 155 In order to
make this determination, the nature and circumstances of each employment
relationship must be examined. 156 Factors the court considered relevant in
determining that Owens' position fell within the exception included Owens'
personal accountability to the sheriff, the sensitive and confidential nature of
the work, the fact that he was second in command and therefore took on the
sheriff's responsibilities when he was away or unable to perform his duties,
and the fact that the sheriff, through his bond, was liable for the undersher-
iff's actions when the undersheriff was in command.
15 7
III. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. Freedom of Religion
The inherent tension between the first amendment's establishment
clause and the free exercise clause was at issue in Lanner v. Wimmer. 158 In a
well reasoned opinion the Tenth Circuit held that although a released-time
program did not constitute aper se violation of the first amendment, certain
aspects of the program were unconstitutional.1
59
Parents of present and future public school students in Logan, Utah
brought a class action suit against the members of the school board challeng-
ing the constitutionality of a released-time program. 160 For more than thirty
years the Utah State Board of Education had permitted high school stu-
dents, upon written request of their parents, to be released for one hour each
day during school hours for religious instruction by the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints. 16 The plaintiffs alleged that this released-time
program violated both the establishment clause and the free exercise clause
of the first amendment.' 62 The district court held the program did not con-
stitute aperse violation of the first amendment, 16 3 but enjoined the granting
of credit for completion of the Old Testament and New Testament course,
the collecting of attendance reports, the recognition of enrollment in semi-
nary classes in fulfillment of minimum hour attendance requirements, and
the counting of seminary attendance in the formula for the school district's
eligibility for state funds.'6
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial court that released-time pro-
grams, which permit students to leave during the school hours to attend reli-
154. 654 F.2d at 1375.
155. Id
156. Id at 1376.
157. Id
158. 662 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1981).
159. Id at 1359.
160. Id at 1356.
161. Lanner v. Wimmer, 463 F. Supp. 867, 870 (D. Utah 1978), a'd inpart, rev d in part, 662
F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1981).
162. 662 F.2d at 1356.
163. 463 F. Supp. at 883.
164. Id at 876-83.
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gious classes, do not unconstitutionally advance or inhibit religion.1 65 The
implementation of the program, however, was analyzed by the criteria de-
veloped by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 166 Under the Lemon
test, 1) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 2) its primary
effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and 3) it must not foster
excessive government entanglement.
1 6 7
The appellate court affirmed the district court's finding that the attend-
ance-gathering procedure was unconstitutional. 16 8 Under this procedure,
student aides went to the released-time schools to pick up the attendance
slips provided by the public schools. Although this may have been a minor
matter, as the district court observed, there was a possibility of government
entanglement and hence, the court of appeals agreed that the use of the
"least entangling administrative alternatives" was required.' 69 While the
school had a legitimate interest in knowing where its students were during
the day, and the seminary's use of the school's slips was the most administra-
tively efficient method for keeping track of the students, the fact that the
public school collected the slips was not the least entangling alternative. "It
is less entangling but as solicitous of the state's interests to require released-
time personnel to transmit attendance reports to the public school."'
1 70
The court, on the other hand, found several aspects of the program con-
stitutional because they were designed to accommodate the program with as
little inconvenience to the students and the administrator as possible.
1 7 1
The court found these aspects of the program to be substantially similar to
the program upheld in Zorach v. Clauson. 172 The connection of the seminary's
bell and intercom system with the public school's system and the use of a box
provided by the school to enable seminary personnel to pick up messages
concerning school programs that may interfere with the seminary's schedule
had a secular purpose. 173 Both the box and the intercom system served the
secular purpose of facilitating a minimum amount of interference with the
public school's meetings.' 74 The court found a lack of excessive entangle-
ment. The intercom system was one-way; it only allowed the public school
to contact its students at the seminary. The boxes worked in the same man-
ner, allowing the seminary to adjust to the school's needs. 175 The seminary,
rather than the government, bore the cost of the installation and mainte-
nance of the intercom system. 1
76
The most troublesome aspect of this case was the credit that was given
165. 662 F.2d at 1347 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952)).
166. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
167. Id at 612-13.
168. 662 F.2d at 1358.
169. Id
170. d at 1359.
171. d
172. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
173. 662 F.2d at 1360.





by the school for the time a student was in seminary classes. The court ex-
amined the issue in light of the several ways the word "credit" was used.
"Credit" was employed to "measure the number of hours or units of instruc-
tion required for graduation from Logan Senior High School."' 17 7 This
practice was mandated by the Utah State Board of Education in guidelines,
limiting the number of transferable hours and the areas to which they could
be applied. More importantly, the Board stated "[nlo credit is to be given to
courses devoted mainly to denominational instruction."' 78 This limitation
on transferable hours created constitutional problems in that it required the
state, through the public schools, to examine and monitor the "content" of
the courses taught at the seminary. 179 The court of appeals found this prac-
tice to be excessive entanglement between the school authorities and the reli-
gious institution. The state may not use a "purely religious test for
determining what is not 'mainly denominational.' "180
The court recognized that this situation must be viewed differently from
the common practice of the state placing requirements upon private reli-
gious schools in order to meet its compulsory education laws. It is not un-
constitutional for the state to require a private secular school to meet certain
minimum qualifications for its teachers and a minimum numbers of hours of
instruction in the required subjects; to determine whether a course covered
the required subject matter; and to monitor the private schools' compli-
ance. 18 ' While the line may be fine at times, there is a difference between
these requirements and the situation in Lanner, where the state judges what is
or what is not religious in a private religious institution. The court found the
monitoring of the content of the courses to be excessive entanglement, offen-
sive to the establishment clause.'
82
The term "credit" was also employed to measure the time during which
minors were required to attend school. ' 83 The court termed this "custodial
credit," utilized to meet the state interest in maintaining supervision.' 84
Under this category, no evaluation of the religious or non-religious character
177. Id at 1360.
178. Id (quoting the Utah Bd. of Education's 1969 Policy Statement, Record, vol. 2, at 350-
g).
179. 662 F.2d at 1361.
180. Id at 1361 (citations omitted).
181. Id
182. d
If the extent of state supervision is only to insure, just as is permitted in the case of
church-sponsored full-time private schools, that certain courses are taught for the req-
uisite hours and that teachers meet minimum qualification standards, nothing in
either the establishment or free exercise clauses would prohibit recognizing all re-
leased-time classes or none, whether religious in content or not, in satisfaction of gradu-
ation requirements.
Id (emphasis in original). See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1972):seegenerall), Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1943); Espinosa v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1980), ajdmem.,
102 S. Ct. 2025 (1982).
183. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-24-1 (1981) provides that: "Every . . .person having control
of any minor between six and eighteen years of age shall be required to send such minor to a
public or regularly established private school during the regularly established school year of the
district in which he resides ... "
184. 662 F.2d at 1362.
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of the classes was necessary. It did not violate the three-prong Lemon test,'8 5
and in fact was complementary to the state's interest.""t;
The term "credit" was also used to measure the school's eligibility for
state aid.187 The school's funding was based upon the number of students
who attended a minimum of four classes per day. The hour spent in the
released-time program was considered in this determination.1"1 In reversing
the district court on this point, the court noted that none of the funding
allocated to the school was given to the released-time school and held the
financial benefit the program may produce for the school constitutional.' 8 9
B. Freedom of Speech and Expression
The Tenth Circuit ruled on an interesting first amendment claim in
McGurran v. Veterans Administration. 19 A government regulation and parallel
union contract clause restricting a Veterans Administration employees'
union's right to display posters on a centrally located union bulletin board
was found to be constitutional.' 9 ' Local No. 1557 of the American Federa-
tion of Government Employees (the "Union") distributed a poster to many
of its members employed by the Veterans Administration's (VA) Regional
Office in Denver. The employees displayed the poster, which "showed a
caricature of President Carter and announced the Union's intention to pro-
test a 'pay cap' or limit on federal salary increases," on various walls, room
dividers, and filing cabinets.' 92 The assistant director for the VA office or-
dered the removal of the posters because their posting violated government
regulations and the Union's contract. The federal regulations involved pro-
hibited such posting except on the bulletin board provided by the govern-
ment for the Union's use.' 93 In the Union's contract, both parties agreed
that the government was to provide a centrally located bulletin board for the
Union's use. 1
94
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's determination that the
regulation was constitutional. The restriction was not related to the subject-
matter content of the posters, but was concerned with their placement.
195
The court stressed the basic principle that not only are first amendment
rights subject to time, place, and manner restrictions,' 96 but that the govern-
ment may "preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
185. S e supra text accompanying note 167.
186. 662 F.2d at 1362.
187. Id.
188. Id
189. Id at 1363. "If giving 'funding credit' for attendance at released-time classes in allo-
cating state subsidies has any effect, its sole effect is to increase funds available to the public
schools. While the practice may assist the public schools, it neither enhances nor inhibits the
church-sponsored released-time courses." Id
190. 665 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. 1981).
191. Id at 322.
192. Id.
193. Id See 41 C.F.R. §§ 101-308 (1981).
194. 665 F.2d at 323.
195. Id. at 322. "The First Amendment does not guarantee the right of expression at any
place a person may choose." Id. (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)).
196. 665 F.2d at 322 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)).
1983]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
lawfully dedicated." 19 7 Alternative means of communication were available
to the Union,1 98 and because of the nature of the areas where the posting
was prohibited, the court found no first amendment violation. The court
also balanced the government's legitimate interest in promoting the effi-
ciency and productivity of its employees with employees' freedom of expres-
sion of ideas.1 99 One major criticism of this opinion is that it could be
subject to a variety of interpretations.
This opinion fails to deal separately with the rights of speech and free
expression for the Union and for the i'dvidual employees. The individual em-
ployees could have posted the materials as an expression of their own views,
and thus, the opinion implies that the Union can contract away its individ-
ual members' first amendment rights. The opinion also does not require a
showing by the government that the employees' work would be affected in
any manner by the existence of the posters in the work area. Absent such a
showing, the employees' freedom of expression interests should have been
upheld.
3. Freedom of the Press and the Right of Access
After the 1980 census, a suit was brought to force adoption of a redis-
tricting plan prior to the 1982 election. During court-ordered compromise
negotiations held at the federal courthouse, Judge Finesilver denied a local
television station's request to allow television cameras into the hearing
rooms.2° ° In Combined Communications Corp. v. Finest'ver,20 the plaintiff televi-
sion station sought a writ of mandamus requiring Judge Finesilver to allow
television broadcast coverage of the negotiations, alleging that the restriction
violated the first amendment right of access to news of the operation and
actions of the government.
20 2
The court of appeals denied the writ, relying on several Supreme Court
decisions addressing the issue of courtroom access. The first amendment
does not grant to the media a constitutional right to televise inside a court-
house. 203 A reporter's rights within a courthouse are no greater than those of
the general public.2° 4 Furthermore, the courtroom and courthouse are
under the control of the court. 20 5 The court then balanced the competing
interests, holding that any benefit derived from the visual presentation of the
197. 665 F.2d at 323 (citing Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536 (1964)).
198. 665 F.2d at 322.
199. Id
200. Combined Communications Corp. v. Finesilver, 672 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1982). The
denial was under Rule 16, Local Rules of Practice, Federal Dist. Courts. Id at 820 n. 1.
201. 672 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1982).
202. Id at 820.
203. 672 F.2d at 821 (citing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 381 (1979); Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1965)).
204. 672 F.2d at 821 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609
(1978)).
205. 672 F.2d at 821 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966)). Due to this
control "courts may impose restrictions upon media access to courtrooms and courthouse prem-
ises when necessary to protect and facilitate the proper administration of the judicial system."
672 F.2d at 821.
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meeting room was outweighed by the potential disruption of the meeting
and other judicial proceedings. The plaintiff was allowed access to the meet-




A. Military Regulations Review by the Judici'ag
Lindenau v. Alexander, 20 7 involved a divorced mother of two minor chil-
dren, who, contrary to regulations, 208 enlisted in the New Mexico Army Na-
tional Guard. When the facts came to light, she was honorably
discharged. 20 9 Soon thereafter she filed suit, challenging the constitutional-
ity of the regulation which, in effect, prohibited a single custodial parent
from enlisting in the National Guard. She alleged that the regulation vio-
lated the equal protection clause because it discriminated against her as an
unmarried parent with a minor child. She also alleged that the regulation
discriminated against all women because it affected more women than men.
In addition, she claimed that the regulation violated the constitutional right
to make private decisions in matters of marriage and family life.
210
In examining the alleged constitutional violation, the Tenth Circuit rec-
ognized the traditional judicial deference to internal military matters.
2 1t
" 'Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to
interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not
to intervene in judicial matters.' ",212 The court noted, nevertheless, that
members of the military community enjoy many of the same rights as mem-
bers of the civilian community.
2 13
Adopting the view of the Fifth Circuit,2i 4 the court determined the
proper scope of review was limited to examining whether a military official
has acted outside the scope of his powers, whether a military official violated
internal regulations, whether statutes relating to the military, executive or-
ders, or regulations are constitutional, and whether procedures followed in
court martials and selective service inductions violate the Constitution.
2i 5
The court also adopted the Fifth Circuit's test 2i 6 for examining an internal
military decision:
206. Id. at 820.
207. 663 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1981).
208. Army Nat'l Guard Reg. AR-601-210, quotd in Lindenau, 663 F.2d at 70.
209. 663 F.2d at 70.
210. Id
211. Id at 70-71. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. See also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498,
510 (1975) ("The responsibility for determining how best our Armed Forces shall attend to that
business rests with Congress."); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) ("The complex, sub-
tle, and professional decision as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a mili-
tary force is essentially professional military judgment, subject always to civilian control of the
Legislative and Executive Branches.') (emphasis in original).
212. 663 F.2d at 70 (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1952)).
213. 663 F.2d at 71 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974)).
214. Se Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971).
215. 663 F.2d at 71.
216. Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971).
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[a] court contemplating review of an internal military determina-
tion [is] first to determine whether the case involves an alleged vio-
lation of a constitutional right, applicable statute, or regulation,
and whether intra-service remedies have been exhausted. If so, the
court is then to weigh the nature and strength of the challenge to
the military determination, the potential injury to the plaintiff if
review is refused, the type and degree of anticipated interference
with the military function, and the extent to which military discre-
tion or expertise is involved in the challenged decision.
2 17
Applying this criteria, the court first examined Lindenau's constitu-
tional claims and held there is no right to enlist in the armed service.218
While Lindenau failed to prove single parents with minor children were a
suspect class, the government articulated a rational basis behind the regula-
tion. 2t 9 In response to Lindenau's claim that the regulation interfered with
her freedom with respect to family matters and marriage, the court of ap-
peals stated: " 'The regulation . . . does not affirmatively curtail marriage
or childbearing,' . but instead insures that National Guard personnel can
rapidly respond to national defense requirements and fulfill their duties
"220
Two factors of the test were in the favor of the government. The Army
National Guard had attempted to function with single custodial parents and
determined that it adversely affected the morale and the ability of the Guard
to mobilize quickly and respond to emergencies.2 2' Lindenau also failed to
prove factually that the regulation discriminates against women because it
adversely affects more women than men. The court found the regulation
was not intended to keep women out of the National Guard. The court
stated that single women parents "with minor children are excluded because
they are single parents with minor children, not because they are
women."
222
Judge McKay concurred with the result, 22 3 although he was troubled
by the majority's reliance upon the Fifth Circuit's decision in Mindes v. Sea-
man. 224 He believed that the Supreme Court's decision in PersonndAdmins-
trator v. Feeney ,225 made Mindes no longer tenable. 226  He would have
adopted the view of the Third Circuit in Dillard v. Brown,227 decided subse-
quent to Feeney.
228
217. NeSmith v. Fulton, 615 F.2d 196, 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (summarizing the requirements
of Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971)).
218. 663 F.2d at 72 (citations omitted).
219. Id at 72-73.
220. Id at 73 (quoting West v. Brown, 558 F.2d 757, 760 (5th Cir. 1977)).
221. Id at 74.
222. Id
223. Id at 74-75 (McKay, J., concurring).
224. 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971).
225. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
226. 663 F.2d at 75.
227. 652 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1981).
228. 663 F.2d at 75.
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B. Standing and Mootness
The question of standing and mootness was addressed by the court in
the context of access for television cameras in a federal district court's hear-
ing room, in Combined Communications Corp. v. Fnesilver.229 The court ruled
that the plaintiff had standing because it suffered an injury in fact with re-
spect to an interest within the zone of protection of the Constitution: 2 30 its




Examining the mootness issue, the court applied the test set forth by the
Supreme Court in Weinstein o. Bradford.232 Although the controversy gener-
ating the case may have passed, the question is not considered moot if
"'1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated
prior to its cessation or expiration, and 2) there was a reasonable expectation
that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action
again.' ",233 Weinstein's first requirement was met due to the short duration
of the hearings. As to the second criterion, the court held that the likelihood
that the plaintiff's cameras would in the future, be barred from statutorily
open meetings conducted at the federal courthouse was "not so remote and
speculative that the controversy must be considered moot. 23 4
C. The Commerce Clause and State Sovereignty
In Oklahoma v. Federal Energy Regulatoy Commission ,235 Oklahoma, Texas,
Wyoming 236 and Louisiana challenged portions of the National Gas Policy
Act of 1979 (Act or NGPA),2 37 as unconstitutional in its application as it
applies to wholly intrastate gas. The plaintiffs contended that the NGPA
was in violation of the commerce clause2 38 because it regulated natural gas
that had not moved in interstate commerce.2 39 Plaintiffs also alleged viola-
229. 672 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1982). See supra text accompanying notes 200-206 for a discus-
sion of this case in another context.
230. 672 F.2d at 820. See also Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
231. 672 F.2d at 820.
232. 423 U.S. 147 (1975) (per curiam).
233. 672 F.2d at 820 (quoting Weinstein, 423 U.S. at 149). See also Napier v. Gertrude, 542
F.2d 825, 826 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denid, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977).
234. 672 F.2d at 821.
235. 661 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1981), ceri. dented, 102 S. Ct. 2902 (1982).
236. Wyoming and Ralph L. Harvey, individually and as the president of Marlin Oil Corp.,
were allowed to intervene as parties plaintiff. The United States was allowed to intervene as a
party defendant. 661 F.2d at 833.
237. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
The relevant portions of the Act included Title I, which establishes price ceilings for
all first sales of natural gas irrespective of its interstate or intrastate character; Title II,
which provides for a pass-through of the costs incurred by interstate pipelines to indus-
trial users and which, while not applicable to intrastate pipelines, prohibits the [sltates
from enacting or enforcing any conflicting regulations; Title III B, which authorizes
sales between interstate and intrastate pipelines in accordance with certain non-dis-
criminatory contractual requirements imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission; and Title V, which provides for the administration of the Act.
661 F.2d at 834.
238. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
239. 661 F.2d at 833-34.
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tions of state sovereignty and immunity as protected under the tenth
amendment.
2 4 °
In upholding the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and its finding that the
Act was constitutional, the court recognized that the district court's analysis
paralleled Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc. 241
Under Hodel, the court's task of assessing whether Congress' exercise of its
power is within its authority under the commerce clause is "relatively nar-
row."' 2 4 2 " 'The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated
activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a
finding.' "243
Congress had determined that the intrastate sale of unregulated natural
gas affected interstate commerce. 244  Relying on Hodel,2 45 the appellate
court deferred to Congress: "[The] [s]tates' burden of establishing that the
means selected by Congress was not reasonably adapted to the end permit-
ted by the Constitution is a heavy one which [the] States have failed to
meet."
246
The court in upholding the dismissal of the state sovereignty and gov-
ernmental immunity claims under the tenth amendment again relied on Ho-
del.24 7 The court noted that the states' participation was not mandated by
the NGPA.248 Furthermore, Congress has the authority to displace or pre-
empt states' laws regulating activity that affects interstate commerce when
they conflict with federal laws.249 By merely allowing the states to partici-
pate in the program if they wished, the NGPA did not mandate state in-
volvement, and did not infringe upon their sovereignty.
2 50
240. Id at 834. U.S. CONST. amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people."
241. 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of the Surface Mining and Recla-
mation Control Act of 1977).
242. 661 F.2d at 837 (quoting Hodl, 452 U.S. at 276).
243. Id SeeaLro Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
244. 661 F.2d at 835-36. The price disparity between the intrastate market and the inter-
state market prompted many producers to sell their production in the intrastate market. The
result was shortages of natural gas in nonproducing states. Id at 834.
245. Once a rational basis for a finding that the regulated activity affects interstate com-
merce is made, the only question is whether "the means chosen by [Congress] is reasonably
adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution." Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276 (citations omitted).
246. 661 F.2d at 838.
247. Id. at 838-39.
248. Id at 840. For a tenth amendment challenge to prevail, there needs to be
a showing the challenged statute regulates the "States as States." Second, the federal
regulation must address matters that are indisputably "attributes of state sovereignty."
And third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance with the federal law would
directly impair their ability "to structure operations in areas of traditional functions."
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-88 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833, 852, 854
(1976)).





The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the question of what
constitutional rights and protections must be afforded aliens who have not
officially entered the United States in Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson.
25'
The plaintiff, a Cuban' national, arrived in the United States on the Free-
dom Flotilla on June 2, 1980. Immigration officials, acting pursuant to stat-
ute,252 allowed him to disembark and placed him in custody, pending a
determination of his eligibility for admission. He told immigration officials
that he had a criminal record and was serving a sentence at the time the
Cuban government allowed him to leave. Based upon his lack of immigra-
tion documents and his criminal record, it was determined that he was not
entitled to disembark and was detained pending an exclusion hearing.
253
He was briefly detained at a processing camp in Wisconsin and then trans-
ferred to the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas.
25 4
The plaintiff was given a formal exclusion hearing on July 21, 1980. At
that time, it was determined that he was an excludable alien and was or-
dered deported to Cuba. Attempts by the State Department to arrange for
Rodriguez-Fernandez' deportation to Cuba were unsuccessful. The plaintiff
remained in custody at the federal penitentiary in Leavenworth. In Septem-
ber, 1980, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Shortly thereafter
he was transferred to the federal penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia.
255
The district court found that while the plaintiff has no rights to avoid
detention under the fifth or eighth amendments, the government's actions
were arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. Furthermore, the court found the
actions to be in violation of principles of international law which create a
right to be free from detention. 256 By order dated December 31, 1980, the
government was given ninety days to release Rodriguez-Fernandez. At a
compliance hearing on April 22, 1981, it was established that the plaintiff
had not yet been released. The government requested another sixty days to
arrange either for the deportation or the parole of Rodriguez-Fernandez.
25 7
The court denied the request, ordering his release within twenty-four
hours.
258
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding and gave the
government thirty days in which to release Rodriguez-Fernandez. 2 59 Judge
Logan, writing for the majority, based the holding on the applicable stat-
utes, but also discussed the constitutional issues presented. The court recog-
nized that as an alien, Rodriguez-Fernandez could invoke no "constitutional
251. 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
252. 8 U.S.C. § 1223(a) (1976). This section provides for the temporary removal of aliens
for examination and inspection upon their arrival at a port of the United States. Under this
section, temporary removal is not to be considered a landing.
253. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9), (20), and 1225(b).
254. 654 F.2d at 1384.
255. Id.
256. 505 F. Supp. 787, 800 (D. Kan. 1980), af'd, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
257. 654 F.2d at 1384.
258. Id at 1390.
259. Id at 1386.
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protections against his exclusion from the United States. '260 Nevertheless,
an alien accused of committing a criminal act in the United States would
have those protections found in the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The
resulting consequence was that "an excludable alien in physical custody
within the United States may not be punished without being accorded the
substantive and procedural due process guarantees of the Fifth
Amendment."
26 1
The court found Rodriguez-Fernandez' imprisonment to be a "depriva-
tion of liberty in violation of the fifth amendment, except for the fiction
applied . . . that detention is only a continuation of the exclusion.
'2 62
Other federal courts have held that the custody of deportable aliens longer
than a "few months" is impermissible imprisonment, requiring release of the
alien.
263
Judge Logan distinguished Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei.2 6 In
Mezei the Supreme Court refused to require the release of an alien who had
been confined to Ellis Island for twenty-one months. His confinement was
based upon the fact that he was excluded from landing in the United States
and no other country would allow him entry.265 Mezei was distinguished on
several grounds: its concern was with an excludable alien's rights to a due
process hearing determining his right of reentry into the United States;
Mezei was considered a security risk; the Korean War was in progress; the
conditions of his confinement were not the same as imprisonment in a fed-
eral penitentiary; there were continuous efforts to deport Mezei; and unlike
Rodriguez-Fernandez, Mezei sought not only release from detention but also
entry to the United States.266 Finally, the Tenth Circuit court followed the
Supreme Court's guidance and applied a basic principle of international
law: "Human beings should be free from arbitrary imprisonment.
' 267
The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952268 provides for a six-
month detention period in deportation cases;269 however, the maximum de-
tention period for excludable aliens seeking entry is not spelled out in the
statute. "They provide for 'temporary removal' from the transportation ve-
hicle or vessel to a place of 'detention, pending a decision on the aliens' eligi-
bility to enter the United States and until they are either allowed to land or
return to the care of the transportation line or to the vessel or aircraft which
260. Id at 1387.
261. Id
262. Id
263. See Petition of Brooks, 5 F.2d 238 (D. Mass. 1925); United States ex rel. Ross v. Wallis,
279 F. 401 (2d Cir. 1922). See also Wolck v. Weedin, 58 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1932); Carancia v.
Nagle, 28 F.2d 955 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 277 U.S. 589 (1928); United States ex re. Janararis v.
Nicholls, 47 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 1942).
264. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
265. Id at 209.
266. 654 F.2d at 1388.
267. Id (citing The American Convention on Human Rights, Pt. I, ch. II, art. 7, 77 Dept. of
State Bull. 28 (July 4, 1977); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Pt. I, arts. 3 & 9, U.N.
Doe. Al 801 (1948)). See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
268. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
269. Id. § 1252(d).
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brought them."'270 While the court of appeals refused to read a specific time
limit for detention into the statute, it held that "detention is permissible dur-
ing proceedings to determine eligibility to enter and, thereafter, during a
reasonable period of negotiations for their return . . . . After such time,
upon application of the incarcerated alien. . . the alien would be entitled to
release.",
27 1
The court did not require the government to release Rodriguez-Fernan-
dez into the United States. He could be returned to the vessel that brought
him to the United States, sent to another country, or paroled. 272 Because
the government did not meet its burden of proving that the detention re-
mained temporary pending exclusion 273 and not an incarceration as an al-
ternative to departure, the court of appeals required his release.
Judge McWilliams dissented, arguing that the district court's release
order should have been reversed. 274 He maintained that the determination
whether the plaintiff should be detained or released on parole, pending de-
portation, was solely within the discretion of the Attorney General. 275 Based
upon his prior criminal record, the decision to detain him in a federal peni-
tentiary was not an abuse of discretion, in Judge McWilliams' view. 2 76 He
found the majority opinion to be flawed in its attempt "to deal with all
125,000 Cuban refugees in this one case."' 277 Judge McWilliams distin-
guished those individuals who had criminal records, such as Rodriguez-Fer-
nandez, from other Cuban refugees. In his opinion, only "the indefinite
detention in a maximum security institution of a true Cuban political refu-
gee with no history of criminality, who is nonetheless determined to be an




270. 654 F.2d at 1389 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1223(b) (1976)). This provision's concern, how-
ever, is with the responsibility of expenses incurred in a temporary removal from the vessel of
entry and does not actually address the time limitations on deportation. It is conceivable that
due to the absence of a specific time period, the court used this section to infer "temporary" as
the limitation on the duration of the detention.
271. 654 F.2d at 1389-90.
272. Id. at 1390.
273. There seemed to be no negotiations with Cuba or any other country to accept Rodri-
guez-Fernandez. The court states that the fact that no country had agreed to take him was
insufficient reason for continued detention. Id
274. Id. at 1390-92 (McWilliams, J., dissenting).
275. Id at 1390-91.
276. Id at 1391. "If Rodriguez-Femandez had been serving a life sentence for murder in
Cuba at the time he got out of Cuba and came to Florida, I cannot believe that there would be
any hue and cry over the fact he was detained in a federal penitentiary . Id
277. Id
278. Id
19831

